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Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.: The Ninth
Circuit Sends the Totten Bar Flying Away on the
Jeppesen Airplane
I. INTRODUCTION
In the en banc decision of Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.
(“Jeppesen”), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the Reynolds privilege iteration of the state secrets
doctrine precluded the suits of several alleged victims of the
government’s infamous “extraordinary rendition”1 program from
proceeding against Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. (“Jeppesen”). Jeppesen
allegedly had been complicit with the federal government in the
program by providing transportation and logistical support that
allowed the plaintiffs to be moved clandestinely to foreign countries,
where they were subjected to torture.2
The state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary privilege that the
federal government is permitted to invoke in the interest of national
security where disclosure of sensitive information during the course
of litigation “might compromise or embarrass our government in its
public duties” or be detrimental to the public welfare.3 The Supreme
Court has created two distinct iterations of the doctrine—the Totten
bar and the Reynolds privilege.4 Where a court determines that the
stronger iteration of the doctrine—the Totten bar—applies, the
lawsuit at issue must categorically be dismissed.5 Where the weaker
iteration of the doctrine—the Reynolds privilege—applies, the lawsuit
1. See Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping
Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629, 629 n.1 (2007) (“The term
‘extraordinary renditions’ refers to a program that began in the early 1990s and continues to
this day, whereby the Central Intelligence Agency, together with other U.S. government
agencies, transfer foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism to detention and
interrogation in countries where—in the U.S. government’s view—federal and international
legal safeguards do not apply. Suspects are detained and interrogated either by U.S. personnel
at U.S.-run detention facilities outside U.S. sovereign territory, or, alternatively, are handed
over to the custody of foreign agents for interrogation.”).
2. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
3. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1875).
4. See infra Parts III.B–C.
5. See infra Part III.A.
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at issue might need to be dismissed in some circumstances, but in
other circumstances the litigation may proceed forward, with the
sensitive information simply being kept out of the record.6
Although the doctrinal existence of the state secrets doctrine is
obviously controversial given that it can prevent litigants from
receiving judicial redress for wrongs perpetrated against them, this
Note does not focus on the advisability of the doctrine, although
plenty of prior scholarly commentary has criticized the doctrine and
suggested the need for its reformation.7 This Note also does not
focus on whether the Ninth Circuit was justified in applying the state
secrets doctrine based on the facts at issue in Jeppesen. Such a critique
would be very difficult. Because the choice about whether to apply
the state secrets doctrine is generally premised on evidence that is
never publicly disclosed,8 it is often nearly impossible for a third-

6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 760, 763 (1991) (arguing that “[t]he current judicial tendency to give wide deference to
government national security claims when they come into conflict with constitutional values is
unjustified by the realities of governmental operations” and noting that “[t]he substantial
record of abuse of the state secrets privilege by the federal government signals a need for
rigorous testing of such claims in the courts” and suggesting that “unless the Reynolds doctrine
is modified, constitutional rights will be unnecessarily sacrificed in the name of national
security”); Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
HARV. L. REV. 827, 936 (1957) (arguing that judges should be permitted to independently
review the documents allegedly containing state secrets in camera to independently determine
whether they should be able to be withheld); Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege:
Expanding Its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 100 (2007)
(arguing that the state secrets doctrine is “being used as a tool to prevent cases that could
otherwise be brought in court from receiving review in that forum. It is effectively denying
litigants their day in court and interfering with public and private rights.”); Daniel C. Gardner,
Comment, The Big Bad State Secrets Privilege: Why McDonnell Douglas’ Superior Knowledge
Claim Was Doomed and How to Minimize the Effects of the Privilege Without Endangering
National Security, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 549, 554, 579, 745 (2001) (referring to the state secrets
doctrine as “invidious” and “drastic” and arguing that “[a]lthough the state secrets privilege is
a proper exercise of the United States sovereign power, the effect of the privilege should be
minimized as much as possible”).
8. For example, in Jeppesen the government filed a classified declaration that never
became part of the record in support of its assertion that the state secrets doctrine applied. The
court made its determination about the appropriate applicability of the doctrine based in large
part upon this classified declaration. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070,
1086 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (“We have thoroughly and
critically reviewed the government’s public and classified declarations and are convinced that at
least some of the matters it seeks to protect from disclosure in this litigation are valid state
secrets . . . . The government’s classified disclosures to the court are persuasive that compelled
or inadvertent disclosure of such information in the course of litigation would seriously harm
legitimate national security interests.”).
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party observer to assess whether a court properly dismissed a suit
where the doctrine was invoked.
Instead, this Note argues that the Jeppesen court, having chosen
to apply the state secrets doctrine, applied it in a fashion that was
clearly out of harmony with relevant Supreme Court state secrets
doctrine precedent. This relevant precedent recognizes that there are
two, distinct iterations of the state secrets doctrine: the more robust
Totten bar and the weaker Reynolds privilege. Although the Ninth
Circuit’s Jeppesen opinion, which applied the Reynolds privilege,
stated that it recognized the independent viability of the Totten bar,
Jeppesen functionally—although only implicitly—abolished that bar
because the court’s justifications for using the Reynolds privilege
instead of the Totten bar are likely to apply in nearly all cases that
implicate the state secrets doctrine. Consequently, lower courts are
likely to read Jeppesen as a mandate to always apply the Reynolds
privilege, effectively abolishing the Totten bar.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The five plaintiffs in Jeppesen alleged that they were victims of the
United States government’s “extraordinary rendition” program.9
The plaintiffs claimed that the government had apprehended them
because of their suspected terrorist activities and transferred them to
foreign countries where they could be tortured and interrogated
using methods prohibited in the United States.10
The first of the plaintiffs, Ahmed Agiza (“Agiza”) was an
Egyptian national. He claimed that he was apprehended while in
Europe, given over to American authorities, and then flown to Egypt
and placed into a “squalid, windowless, and frigid cell” where he
endured tortures such as “severe[] and repeated[] beat[ings]” and
“electric shock through electrodes attached to his ear lobes, nipples
and genitals.”11 After being held for over two years, he received a
fifteen-year sentence in an Egyptian prison.12
Agiza’s experience was similar to the experiences of the other
four plaintiffs. Each of the other plaintiffs, like Agiza, claimed to
have suffered unspeakable tortures such as being “deprived of sleep

9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1073–74.
See id. at 1073–75.
Id. at 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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and food and threatened with sexual torture, including sodomy with
a bottle and castration,”13 “routine[] beating . . . and breaking [of]
bones,” “cut[ting] with a scalpel all over [the] body including [the]
penis” followed by “pour[ing] ‘hot stinging liquid’ into the open
wounds,” and “being made to ‘listen to extremely loud music day
and night’” and other loud noises, including “the recorded screams
of women and children.”14
The five plaintiffs brought suit against Jeppesen, a United States
corporation that provides logistical transportation support services,
including a full range of services catering to the military,15 for the
company’s alleged involvement in transporting the plaintiffs to the
sites where they were allegedly tortured.16 The plaintiffs claimed that
Jeppesen had “provided flight planning and logistical support
services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights transporting each
of the five plaintiffs among the various locations where they were
detained and allegedly subjected to torture.”17 The plaintiffs also
claimed that Jeppesen had “actual or constructive knowledge” that
these planes were a part of the extraordinary rendition program.18
The procedural history of Jeppesen is relatively complex. As soon
as the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and before Jeppesen had even
answered, the United States government moved to intervene in the
suit and to have the complaint dismissed.19 The United States filed
two declarations in support of its motion to dismiss; one of these
documents was classified and the other was public.20 The public
declaration explained that allowing for disclosure of the information
claimed as privileged “could be expected to cause serious—and in
some instances exceptionally grave—damage to the national security
of the United States.”21 Consequently, the declaration stated that
13. Id. (describing the experience of “Plaintiff Abou Elkassim Britel, a 40-year-old
Italian citizen of Moroccan origin”).
14. Id. (recounting the experience of “Plaintiff Binyam Mohamed, a 28-year-old
Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom”).
DATAPLAN,
INC.,
http://www.jeppesen.com/industry15. See
JEPPESEN
solutions/aviation/military/jeppesen-military-products-and-services.jsp (last visited Oct. 15,
2011) (containing a description of the military logistical services provided by Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc.).
16. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1075.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1076.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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“because highly classified information is central to the allegations
and issues in this case,” the court should dismiss the case.22
Alternatively, the United States government asserted that at the very
least the “information should be excluded from any use in this
case.”23
The district court granted the government’s motion for
dismissal, finding that this was clearly a matter that implicated the
state secrets doctrine.24 The plaintiffs appealed, and a three-judge
panel from the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that
the government had not established the applicability of the state
secrets doctrine, but allowing for the possibility that the doctrine
might be used later in the litigation.25 Before the case had actually
been remanded, the Ninth Circuit decided to reconsider the case “en
banc to resolve questions of exceptional importance regarding the
scope and application of the state secrets doctrine.”26
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
After very briefly introducing the state secrets doctrine, the
remainder of this section explains the jurisprudential development of
the two separate iterations of the doctrine: the Totten bar and the
Reynolds privilege.
A. State Secrets Doctrine
The state secrets doctrine made its first appearance in American
courts directly following the Civil War in the 1875 case of Totten v.
United States.27 The state secrets doctrine is a privilege that may only

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1076–77.
25. Id. at 1077.
26. Id. En banc hearings are generally reserved for these exceptional circumstances. Fed.
R. App. P. 35(a)(2) (“A majority of the circuit judges . . . may order that an appeal or other
proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless . . . the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance.”).
27. See Jason A. Crook, From the Civil War to the War on Terror: The Evolution and
Application of the State Secrets Privilege, 72 ALB. L. REV. 57, 58 (2009) (“Although it would
take some time for the state secrets privilege to develop its current scope and power, the case
of Totten v. United States marks the first general instance of its use in American
jurisprudence.”); c.f. Hansen, supra note 1, at 631 n.8 (suggesting that dicta in the 1803
Supreme Court decision of Marbury v. Madison was an early application of the doctrine).
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be asserted by the government, never by a private actor.28 The
doctrine is premised on the idea that courts must act to “prevent
disclosure of state secrets” in a narrow class of “exceptional
circumstances” where such prevention of disclosure is “in the interest
of the country’s national security.”29
Because application of the state secrets doctrine may impair the
rights of litigants, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the
government should only be permitted to employ the state secrets
doctrine in narrow circumstances.30 Nonetheless, where necessary in
the interest of national security, application of the stronger iteration
of the state secrets doctrine, the Totten bar, can result in the
“dismissing [of] a case entirely.”31 In other cases, though, a weaker
iteration of the doctrine, the Reynolds privilege, might merely act to
require exclusion of certain evidence, but still allow a case to proceed
forward.32
B. The Totten Bar
As mentioned in the foregoing section, the first application of
the state secrets doctrine in the United States came in the post-Civil
War case of Totten v. United States. Totten involved a breach of
contract claim by the executor of the estate of a former Union spy
against the federal government.33 The executor claimed that the
deceased spy, William A. Lloyd, had entered into an espionage
contract with President Lincoln in July 1861.34 The executor claimed
that while Lloyd fulfilled his obligation by spying throughout the
duration of the war, at the close of the war he had only been paid an
amount sufficient to reimburse him for his expenses, not the
promised consideration under his contract.35
Without disputing the validity of the executor’s contractual
claim, the Supreme Court determined that the claim could not

28.
29.
30.
31.
(1875).
32.
33.
34.
35.

412

See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077.
See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7.
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077; see also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105–06
See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–9.
Totten, 92 U.S. at 105–06.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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proceed.36 The Court noted that the employment of spies was secret
and clandestine and that, in an action such as this one, allowing a
suit to proceed might expose sensitive facts “to the serious detriment
of the public” or “might compromise or embarrass our government
in its public duties.”37 The Court noted that if this litigation were
allowed to continue forward, thereby creating “liability to publicity,”
the government’s ability to carry out the country’s “indispensable”
program of “secret service” would be “impossible.”38 Consequently,
the Supreme Court dismissed the entire lawsuit.39 Thus, although
Totten did not fully define the contours of the Totten bar iteration of
the state secrets doctrine, the case did establish that application of
the Totten bar categorically requires case dismissal.
While a number of later cases have utilized the Totten bar,40
because of space constraints, the only other Totten bar case that will
be addressed here is the Supreme Court’s most recent decision
invoking the bar, the 2005 decision of Tenet v. Doe. Prior to Tenet,
some commentators had suggested that the Totten bar had been
completely eclipsed by the other iteration of the state secrets
doctrine, the Reynolds privilege.41 However, the Supreme Court
made clear, by reversing the Ninth Circuit in Tenet, that the Totten
bar is alive and well.
Tenet involved a claim by a former spy of the United States. This
spy, who apparently had provided espionage services during the Cold
War era, claimed that the government had promised to always
provide him and his wife with financial assistance and security for life;
he alleged that following the close of the Cold War, the government
actually began providing the couple with monetary benefit payments.
Later, the spy agreed to the cessation of such benefits because he
found stable work.42 All was well until 1997, when the former spy
was laid off from the employment he had found.43 When he could
36. Id. at 106–07.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 107.
40. See Sean C. Flynn, The Totten Doctrine and Its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REV.
793, 793-94 (2000) (explaining that the Totten bar has been invoked over sixty-five times and
providing citations to all of the cases that have invoked the bar).
41. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1, at 633 (“The current incarnation of the state secrets
privilege derives from the Cold War era case of United States v. Reynolds.”).
42. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 4 (2005).
43. Id.
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not readily find other work, he asked the government to begin
providing him with benefits once again, but the government
refused.44 He brought suit.
The Court held that his claim was prohibited from proceeding by
the Totten bar, thereby reasserting the validity of this particular
iteration of the state secrets doctrine.45 The Court reasoned that if
the suit continued, there existed the “possibility that . . . an
espionage relationship may be revealed [which might] well impair
intelligence gathering . . . [or] reveal classified information that may
undermine ongoing covert operations,” a possibility the Court
deemed “unacceptable.”46 The Court stated that the Ninth Circuit
was wrong to believe that Totten “had been recast simply as an early
expression of the evidentiary ‘state secrets’ privilege, rather than a
categorical bar to . . . claims.”47 The Court noted that it had
continued to look to Totten in contemporary cases48 and that the
Totten bar prong of the state secrets doctrine still had independent
viability and vitality.49 The Court explained that Totten should apply
as a categorical bar in all cases where “trial . . . would inevitably lead
to disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential,”50 such as when prevailing in a case would require
showing “the existence of [a] secret espionage relationship with the
Government.”51
C. The Reynolds Privilege
As previously noted, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the
state secrets doctrine should not be lightly deployed by courts

44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 8.
48. For example, the Court noted that it had relied on Totten in Weinberger v. Catholic
Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146–47 (1981) and explained that
Weinberger had “cite[d] Totten in holding that ‘whether or not the Navy has complied with [§
102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 . . . ‘to the fullest extent
possible’ is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case,’ where ‘[d]ue to national security reasons,’ the
Navy could ‘neither admit nor deny’ the fact that was central to the suit, i.e., ‘that it
propose[d] to store nuclear weapons’ at a facility.” Id. at 9.
49. See id. at 8–9.
50. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
51. Id.
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because it can impair the rights of litigants.52 As the previous
subsection established, there are certain state secrets cases where
litigation simply cannot proceed; however, in other cases, a softer
iteration of the state secrets doctrine is sufficient to protect the
government’s interest in nondisclosure of sensitive information. The
Court first recognized this softer iteration of the doctrine in the
1953 case of United States v. Reynolds.53
In Reynolds, the estates of several civilians brought suit against
the government after the civilians were killed in a military aircraft
accident.54 This aircraft had been testing top-secret electronic
equipment.55 Pursuant to the litigation, the victims’ families sought
discovery of the official accident investigation documents from the
Air Force, and the government moved to quash this motion, citing
the state secrets doctrine and explaining that the accident report
contained secret information.56 The Court held that a gentler
iteration of the state secrets doctrine, the Reynolds privilege, was
applicable.57 The Court adopted a sort of “balancing test” approach
for invocations of the Reynolds privilege58 and noted that the
strength of the privilege varies in relation to the degree to which the
plaintiffs in court need the evidence. The Court also explained,
however, that even where there is a great need for such evidence, if
state secrets are truly implicated, such evidence must nonetheless be
excluded.59
The Court clearly established that the Reynolds evidentiary
privilege operated dissimilarly to the Totten bar. The Reynolds
privilege operates as an evidentiary privilege during the course of
litigation that allows certain suits to proceed, while the Totten bar
52. See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through
Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 100 (2007) (arguing that the state secrets
doctrine is “being used as a tool to prevent cases that could otherwise be brought in court
from receiving review in that forum. It is effectively denying litigants their day in court and
interfering with public and private rights.”).
53. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). But see Lyons, supra note 52, at 101 (noting that there was a
“common-law privilege” that “had a life prior to Reynolds”).
54. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2–3.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 3–4.
57. Id. at 6–9.
58. Lyons, supra note 52, at 103 (“A critical aspect of the Reynolds holding is the
Court’s formulation of a balancing test, which should be applied on a case-by-case basis when
addressing the privilege.”).
59. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
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instead bars a suit at the pleading stage and categorically precludes
further litigation.60
While a number of later, lower-court decisions have utilized the
Reynolds privilege, in the interest of space, these later, lower-court
decisions are not considered in this Note.61 The Supreme Court has
not provided further explication of the privilege, but it did reassert
its viability in dicta in Tenet v. Doe.62
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S JEPPESEN DECISION
The Ninth Circuit’s Jeppesen opinion began by noting that the
decision was complex because it required the court to “address the
difficult balance the state secrets doctrine strikes between
fundamental principles of our liberty, including justice, transparency,
accountability and national security.”63 The majority opinion further
noted that “[a]lthough as judges we strive to honor all of these
principles, there are times when exceptional circumstances create an
irreconcilable conflict between them.” The majority explained that
Jeppesen was such a case.64
After recounting the facts and procedural history of the case, the
Ninth Circuit provided a brief explanation of the Totten bar and a
very detailed explanation of the Reynolds privilege.65 The court noted
that the Totten bar and Reynolds privilege are distinct iterations of
the state secrets doctrine.66 It clarified that while the Totten bar has

60. See id. at 11 n.26 (explaining that in Totten “where the very subject matter of the
action, a contract to perform espionage, was a matter of state secret,” then “[t]he action was
dismissed on the pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it was so
obvious that the action should never prevail”).
61. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2007)
(explaining that “Reynolds, the Supreme Court’s leading decision on the state secrets privilege,
established the doctrine in its modern form,” before applying the doctrine); Black v. United
States, 62 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the “state secrets privilege is
defined in [Reynolds]”); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
62. 544 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2005); see also Lyons, supra note 52 at 105 (noting that the
Supreme “Court recently reaffirmed the Reynolds standards in dicta in Tenet v. Doe”).
63. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010).
64. Id.
65. The court’s explanation of the Totten bar that spanned less than two pages, id. at
1077–79, was far less detailed than its explanation of the Reynolds privilege, which spanned
over five pages, id. at 1079–1083.
66. Id. at 1077 (“The contemporary state secrets doctrine encompasses two applications
of this principle. One completely bars adjudication of claims premised on state secrets (the
‘Totten bar’); the other is an evidentiary privilege (‘the Reynolds privilege’). . . .”).
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been commonly interpreted to apply to espionage cases, it is not
limited only to cases involving espionage relationships with the
government because it “rests on a general principle that extends
beyond that specific context.”67 Furthermore, the bar “has evolved
into the principle that where the very subject matter of a lawsuit is a
matter of state secret, the action must be dismissed without reaching
the question of evidence.”68 The majority opinion also explained that
“[t]he purpose of the bar . . . is to prevent the revelation of state
secrets harmful to national security”69 and “[i]n addition to the
Totten bar,” there is another iteration of the state secrets doctrine.70
Instead of acting as a categorical bar, this additional iteration works
as an evidentiary privilege that, “[u]nlike the Totten bar . . . does not
automatically require dismissal of [a] case.”71 The court explained
that application of the Reynolds privilege involves a three-step process
that (1) requires certain procedural requirements be met, (2)
requires the court to make an independent investigation about
whether the information is privileged, and (3) requires the court to
determine how to proceed if the information is deemed privileged.72
After explaining the differences between the Totten bar and the
Reynolds privilege, the majority opinion applied both to the plaintiffs
in Jeppesen.73 In applying the Totten bar, the Ninth Circuit explained
that “some of plaintiffs’ claims might well fall within the Totten bar,”
but it further noted that the Supreme Court had not “offered much
guidance on when the Totten bar” applied outside of cases “premised
on secret espionage agreements or the location of nuclear
weapons.”74 It added that because the Totten bar was infrequently
invoked and because “conducting a more detailed analysis [would]
tend to improve the accuracy, transparency and legitimacy of
proceedings,” district courts should “ordinarily undertake a detailed
Reynolds analysis before deciding whether dismissal on the pleadings
is justified.”75 The court stated it would not “resolve the difficult
67. Id. at 1078–79.
68. Id. at 1079 (quoting Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,
1197 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1080.
73. Id. at 1083.
74. Id. at 1084.
75. Id.
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question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten
because application of the Reynolds privilege leads us to conclude
that this litigation cannot proceed further.”76
The Ninth Circuit stated that it chose to rely on the Reynolds
privilege instead of the Totten bar for three reasons: (1) the
government had raised both a Reynolds privilege claim and a Totten
bar claim so the court was at liberty to address both claims, (2) the
court was at liberty to affirm on any basis supported by the record,
and (3) resolving the case under Reynolds “avoid[ed] difficult
questions about the precise scope of the Totten bar and permits us to
conduct a searching judicial review . . . .”77 The court then applied
the Reynolds privilege, ultimately concluding, after “thoroughly and
critically” reviewing the government’s declarations, that some of the
evidence was privileged and that dismissal of the case on the basis of
the Reynolds privilege was the proper course of action because there
was “no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen’s alleged liability without
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets.”78 The
majority opinion concluded by noting that its decision would
provide guidance for lower courts who would now know that
“Totten has its limits” and that “every effort should be made to parse
claims to salvage a case like this using the Reynolds approach,”
because “the standards for peremptory dismissal are very high and it
is the district court’s role to use its fact-finding and other tools to
full advantage before it concludes that the rare step of dismissal is
justified.”79
An extremely short, two-paragraph concurring judgment
followed, with a single concurring judge suggesting that the case
should have properly been decided under the Totten bar.80 Five
judges dissented.81 A detailed discussion of the dissent is omitted
because it is not relevant to this Note, but the dissent’s main
contention was that only the Totten bar, and never the Reynolds
privilege, could be permissibly applied to dismiss a case at the
pleadings stage.82
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
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V. ANALYSIS

The Jeppesen decision is out of sync with relevant, recent
Supreme Court precedent. Although this precedent suggests that the
Totten bar is an independently viable iteration of the state secrets
doctrine, the Jeppesen decision nonetheless subtly and implicitly
discards the Totten bar because the decision’s justifications for
resolving the case using the Reynolds privilege instead of the Totten
bar are likely to apply in nearly all future cases where the state secrets
doctrine is implicated. This section begins by explaining why clear
and transparent legal standards are of particularly great importance in
the area of state secrets doctrine jurisprudence. Then, this section
explains why the Ninth Circuit’s Jeppesen decision lacked clarity by
exploring the Jeppesen court’s justifications for resolving the case
using the Reynolds privilege instead of the Totten bar. Finally, this
section concludes by discussing how the application of these
justifications in future cases will create a fundamental and
impermissible reworking of state secrets jurisprudence that is out of
sync with relevant Supreme Court precedent.
A. State Secrets Doctrine—Balance of Competing Interests
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to articulate clear legal standards to
guide the proper application of the state secrets doctrine is
particularly troubling given the manner in which the state secrets
doctrine is applied and the important interests at stake.83 The nature
of the state secrets doctrine makes it largely impossible for thirdparty observers to assess whether courts have properly applied the
doctrine because where the Totten bar iteration of the doctrine
applies, it completely precludes litigation from proceeding, and
where the Reynolds privilege iteration applies, it prevents certain
evidence from ever being entered into the record.84
In cases where a court must decide whether to apply an iteration
of the state secrets doctrine, the court is essentially asked to weigh
transparency, justice, and disclosure against the executive’s assertion
of a need to protect national security. After engaging in this
balancing inquiry, the court must then decide which of these
interests is paramount. Given the important interests at stake in this

83. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 8.
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balancing inquiry and the difficulty of critically assessing a court’s
decision about whether to apply the state secrets doctrine, there are
few areas of the law where clear legal standards are of greater
importance.
B. Totten Bar Versus Reynolds Privilege
Although the Jeppesen court understood that it was being asked
to weigh competing interests,85 an inquiry that should have signaled
the necessity of transparent legal reasoning, the court’s legal
reasoning nonetheless proceeded in an opaque fashion. While the
court correctly recognized that the state secrets doctrines has two
distinct iterations,86 the court decided the case under the Reynolds
privilege without providing adequate explanation as to why the more
restrictive Totten bar should not apply.87
Initially, the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Reynolds privilege
instead of the Totten bar appears functionally unproblematic because
it produced the same ultimate result as an application of the Totten
bar would have produced. However, such an analysis ignores the ex
ante effects of the decision upon future cases where the state secrets
doctrine will be implicated.
Supreme Court precedent has clearly established that the Totten
bar and the Reynolds privilege are distinct iterations of the state
secrets doctrine even if the application of the Reynolds privilege
ultimately produced the same level of protection as the Totten bar in
the specific Jeppesen case.88 The Totten bar provides greater
protection against disclosure of state secrets since it categorically
requires dismissal of suits, whereas the Reynolds privilege is a mere
evidentiary privilege that may or may not require dismissal.
Therefore, from a macro viewpoint the Totten bar provides greater
protection against disclosure of state secrets than the Reynolds
privilege.
Given that the Ninth Circuit understood that the Totten bar was
a more restrictive standard, why then did it still decide Jeppesen by
using the Reynolds privilege? Firstly, the court reasoned that the legal

85. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1093 (“We also acknowledge that this case presents a
painful conflict between human rights and national security.”).
86. See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
88. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005).
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standards governing the applicability of the Totten bar were unclear,
and secondly, because the case involved a difficult decision that
required the court to weigh various “competing values” that
warranted a more searching inquiry.89 Therefore, it appears that the
court used the Reynolds privilege because the case was a hard one,
and the court was uncertain whether the Totten bar applied. These
justifications seem reasonable, but considering the likely effects of
applying them in future state secrets doctrine cases illustrates why
these justifications are problematic.
While the Ninth Circuit may be correct in asserting that the legal
standards governing the applicability of the Totten bar are not as
clear as they might be,90 the court ignores the fact that the Supreme
Court applied the standard as recently as 2005, suggesting that the
standards are not so esoteric that they lack any meaning.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Ninth Circuit seemingly
fails to recognize that nearly all cases involving potential application
of the state secrets doctrine will involve “competing values”91 similar
to those implicated in Jeppesen. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s
justifications for not using the Totten bar will be applicable in nearly
all state secrets doctrine cases. Because this is true, although the
Ninth Circuit made a paean to the Totten bar’s continuing viability,
the court simultaneously signaled its untimely death by failing to
articulate legal standards that would guide lower courts in their
future attempts to apply the bar in future cases and by suggesting
that the bar is inapplicable in cases, like Jeppesen, that involve
“competing values.” The court’s reasoning thus weakens the state
secrets doctrine by functionally placing a jurisprudential thumb on
the side of the balancing scale where the values of transparency,
justice, and full disclosure lie. Under the new, Ninth Circuit statesecrets jurisprudential model, these values occupy a position of
relative favor as compared to national security interests because the
values of justice, transparency and full disclosure are omnipresent
“competing values,” and it will nearly always be uncertain whether
the Totten bar should apply. Therefore, lower courts, unsure of when
the Totten bar should apply, and weighing the many “competing
values” inherent in cases involving application of the state secrets
89. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1084.
90. See id.
91. “[T]he state secrets doctrine . . . [must balance] fundamental principles of our
liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability and national security.” Id. at 1073.
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doctrine, will likely always use—out of an abundance of caution—the
less restrictive Reynolds privilege.92
While many commentators might see such a weakening of the
state secrets doctrine as a positive legal development,93 this Note is
not focused on the advisability of the state secrets doctrine. If the
Totten bar is going to be discarded, it should be discarded clearly,
openly, and based on its merits, instead of implicitly through sleight
of hand and a categorical shift. In addition, because the Supreme
Court has asserted the viability of the Totten bar as recently as 2005,
the Supreme Court is the only actor empowered to abandon the bar.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit stated that the Totten bar is an
independent iteration of the state secrets doctrine, because the
court’s justifications for resolving Jeppesen using the Reynolds
privilege instead of the Totten bar are likely to apply in nearly all state
secrets cases, the court’s opinion effectively discarded the Totten bar,
which provides greater protection for state secrets. Consequently,
Jeppesen is out of sync with relevant Supreme Court precedent
explaining that the Totten bar is still a viable, independent iteration
of the state secrets doctrine.
Michael Q. Cannon



92. See id. at 1084–85 (explaining that a lack of clarity and certainty meant that courts
should “ordinarily undertake a detailed Reynolds analysis before deciding whether dismissal on
the pleadings is justified”).
93. See generally, e.g., Christopher D. Yamaoka, The State Secrets Privilege: What’s Wrong
With It, How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
139 (2007–08).
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